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about a process that has
been approved by Congress
By Theodore 0. Rogers Jr.
T he essence of propaganda - or "spin" as it is often
more delicately called - is constant repetition of
distortions. The ongoing assault on arbitration of
employment disputes represents a textbook illustration of
the tactic.
The truth about arbi-
tration is that it is a congres-
sionally approved mecha-
nism for resolution ofclaims
that saves all parties time
and expense. Plaintiffs have
historically fared better in
employment arbitration than
in court. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in its 1991 decision
upholding mandatory arbitration of federal age discrimina-
tion cases, Gilner v. Interstate Johnson-Lane,' addressed
criticisms of arbitration and flatly rejected them, stating that
they are "'far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of
resolving disputes'."2
Those who try to portray arbitration as an
unauthorized evasion of the courts ignore the fact that
Congress explicitly endorsed arbitration as an alternative
forum for the resolution of claims under congressional
statutes by enacting the Federal Arbitration Act.' In the
words of the Supreme Court, the FAA constitutes a
"congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements."' Nor does arbitration
result in the abrogation of substantive rights. The Supreme
Court has confirmed that "'[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than ajudicial, forum'. '"
Those opposing arbitration avoid discussion of the
realities of employment litigation in the courts. The courts
are overwhelmed by these cases, and the costs of litigating
are onerous. A federal judge recently observed that in the
Continued on page 6.
Theodore 0. Rogers Jr. is a member of Sullivan
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rogerst@sulcrom.com.




By Jean R. Sternlight
ourts, arbitral organizations and governmental agencies
are increasingly recognizing that mandatory binding
arbitration can be used both to disadvantage employees
and consumers, and to evade legal requirements. Rather
than merely allowing two willing and knowing businesses to
achieve a quicker cheaper
justice, as Congress
intended when it passed
the Federal Arbitration Act
in 1925,' such clauses may
permit a knowledgeable and
powerful entity to trick or
coerce individuals into
effectively waiving their
rights under federal or state
law.
Aggressive policies, practices
For a while it appeared that the lessons most of us
learned in civics class - that the legislature makes the law,
which the executive enforces and the courts interpret -
would be relegated to history. Emboldened by a series of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions over the last decade, private
parties such as employers, manufacturers and financial
organizations began using binding arbitration agreements
to skirt the public law, and public juries, with increasing
intensity.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gilner v.
hier'tate/Iohnson Lane,2 in which the justices rejected
facial challenges to the validity of mandatory arbitration of
an age discrimination case, in particular seemed to give
lower courts the green light to uphold the validity of such
arbitration provisions, using supposed "freedom of
contract" concepts to insist that employees and consumers
had relinquished their rights to go to court.
As a result, a number of companies have forced their
new or even current employees to sign documents in which
they give up their rights to resolve disputes in courts - and
Continued on page 7.
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continued from page 5.
typically beforejuries - as a condition
of their future or continued
employment. Then, when such
employees seek to resolve contractual,
statutory, or even civil rights claims
against their employers, they are told
that the suits can only be brought in
arbitration, from which there is
effectively no appeal.
Serious issues of coercion
and unconscionability aside, at least
affected employees typically are given
something to sign, even if just an
acknowledgment of receipt of a
company handbook! Consumers too
often haven't been afforded even that
much of late. Last year, in Hill v.
Gateway 2000, hIc.,4 for example, the
71h U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
deemed purchasers of Gateway
computers to have waived their rights
to go to court when, unbeknownst to
the consumers, the computers
they purchased by phone
arrived in a box also containing lU
a lengthy warranty that
included an arbitration a
provision on page 3 paragraph
10. In 1994, a state Superior
Court in California similarly d
held that depositors who kept
their money at Bank ofAmerica e
exchanged their rights to litigate th
for binding arbitration merely
because they received, in an
envelope containing other
materials, an announcement
from the bank providing in fine print
that all future claims must be arbitrated.3
Drafters ofsuch clauses claim that
they benefit employees and consumers
as well as the employers, manufacturers,
banks and service providers who
typically prepare the provision. They
argue that arbitration is quicker and
cheaper than litigation and that both
disputants and the public at large will
be better off if we trade in our right to
litigate for binding arbitration.
Major flaws In argument
While binding arbitration potentially
can be faster and cheaper than
litigation, there are at least three major
flaws with this argument. First, binding
arbitration necessarily lacks the
publicity, the jury trial and the right of
appeal that are fundamental to our
system of justice. Few of us could
imagine or would wish to live in a
society in which important issues of
public policy were exclusively resolved
in private, and virtually without appeal.
Second, drafters of arbitration
clauses will inevitably be tempted to
use arbitration clauses to provide
themselves with various unfair
advantages. For example, such clauses
have been structured to allow disputes
to be resolved by biased panelists, to
increase claimants' dispute resolution
costs compared to litigation by
imposing high arbitration fees or
setting the arbitration in a distant
location, to shorten claimants' statutes
of limitation, or to limit the types of
relief that can be afforded to claimants,
such as the availability of punitive or
compensatory damages. Recognizing
F binding arbitration is id
* wonderfu and fair as its
oates claim, why make it
atory? Why not provide ai
quate notice ad explanad
inform actual and meani
arty choice?
that arbitration can at times be more
costly and less effective than litigation,
drafting parties have sometimes
reserved to themselves the option to
litigate claims important to them, while
limiting the consumer or franchisee to
arbitral remedies." Sadly, too many of
such clauses have been upheld by too
many courts.
Third, if binding arbitration were
indeed always as wonderful and fair as
its advocates claim, why make it
mandatory? Why not allow employees,
consumers or others to choose
arbitration over litigation knowingly,
after the dispute has arisen? Why not
agree to place waivers of litigation and
jury trial rights in bold writing, and to
provide adequate explanations to
persons who are exchanging their day
in court for private arbitration? The
frequently made response - that
plaintiffs' lawyers will trick or coerce
their clients into rejecting arbitration
in favorof litigation-simply makes no
sense. Even assuming such attorneys
are unethical and willing to sacrifice
their clients' interests to their own,
why would attorneys operating on a
contingent fee prefer a more costly
and more time consuming remedy?
They don't! Where binding arbitration
is truly fair it is well accepted by
plaintiffs' counsel. However, such
attorneys do oppose unfair arbitration,
as they should.
Time of retrenchment
As so often happens, over-
reaching may once again be giving
way to retrenchment, as the tide seems
to be turning away from the "anything
goes" approach of the
earlier 1990s.




Dunlop Commission andd.n a number of arbitration
organizations - including
0L5 the National Academy of
0ofu,1d  Arbitrators' - have come




other groups of arbitrators have urged
or required their members not to
participate in arbitration that does not
meet certain minimum due process
requirements.'"
Some courts, too, have begun to
cut back, using a variety of techniques
to strike at least the worst of such
clauses. Several have voided egregious
clauses on contractual grounds, such
as unconscionability" or lack of
consideration. -2 Others have refused
to uphold pre-dispute "agreements" to
arbitrate claims under specific federal
statutes, such as Title VII, unless those
agreements meet certain procedural 3
or substantive requirements. 4 This
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spring, federal courts on both coasts
went even further, holding that job
bias claims under Title VII are generally
not subject to mandatory arbitration. 5
It is perfectly sensible to
distinguish between those arbitration
agreements entered voluntarily and
knowingly by two businesses, and
those imposed by a business on an
employee or consumer. In fact,
numerous European countries have
been making such a distinction for
years, protecting their employees and
consumers against the likelihood of
unfair arbitration agreements. 6
Those of us who value arbitration
must continue to urge courts,
legislators, policymakers, businesses
and arbitrators to limit its use in these
potentially unfair contexts. If we do
not take action, we face a serious risk
that the ultimate outcry against unfair
arbitration will doom not only abusive
misuses of arbitration, but also fair and
valuable uses of this important dispute
resolution technique.
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Announces
A Powerful Conference
Dispute Resolution - Catch The Next Wave:
Successful Applications for Lawyers
Beverly Hilton, Los Angeles, CA
February 5 - 6, 1999
Four major themes will be addressed:
Cutting-Edge Issues inArbitration
Mediation: The Second Generation
The Relationship between Courts and the
Private ADR Market
Corporate and Public-Sector Uses ofADR
Issues developed in the plenary. sessions will be applied to
various subject matters including labor and employment
law, intellectual property, hi-tech and entertainment law;
real estate, construction and environmental law; and tort/
product liability/professional negligence
For further Information and registration,
please call Jennifer Dabson at 202 662-1687
Fax 202 662-1683, e-maIl Jdabson@staff.abanet.org
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A 'ConnU e omomilse'
Enforce agreements, even if adhesive,
but ensure partidpants a fair process
By Terry L. Trantina
U nder the Federal Arbitration Act("FAA") an  most state rbitration
acts, employees and consumers can be
required by a predispute agreement to
resolve their contract, common law and
statutory claims through binding arbi-
tration rather than through litigation in
state or !.idera! court.'
Such predispute agreements may
be enforced even though the obliga-
tion to arbitrate may have been
obtained on a "take it or leave it" basis,
as long as the "adhesive" contract
containing the obligation to arbitrate is
not, in context, beyond reasonable
expectations, unconscionable or op-
pressive. However, whether employ-
ees and consumers should be required
by such adhesive predispute contract
environments to submit their disputes
to binding arbitration, and if so, under
what set of circumstances, are different
questions.
A clash In policies
These questions recall to the
period when arbitration was viewed by
the courts with suspicion and as an
inferior means of resolving disputes.
Today, our civil court system is
underfunded, economically unavailable
to many, unnecessarily adversarial and
complex, and final decisions are usually
many years in the making. As a result,
it is now the stated public policy of our
courts, both federal and state, that
agreements to arbitrate can and should
be enforced. Arbitration can be
beneficial to all parties to a dispute
because final and binding arbitration
has a greater potential than our civil
courts for resolving disputes quickly,
with less cost, and with greater
Terry L. Trantina is a partner with
Ravin, Sarasohn, Cook, Baumgarten,
Fisch & Rosen in Roseland, N.J. He
may be reached at
ttrantin@ravinpc.attmail.com.
satisfaction for the participants without
sacrificing the availability and
enforceability ofremedies.
There is not, however, universal
agreement that arbitration has these
potential benefits for consumers and
employees, particularly where the
obligation to arbitrate is based on a
predispute agreement that is imposed
on a "take it or leave it basis." The
requirement to submit a dispute to
arbitration rather than to the court
system involves the waiver of a party's
access to public
courts, a jury and
an appeal, as well








arbitrate, in the workplace and the
consumer marketplace, even though
these environments are
unquestionably characterized by
uneven bargaining power. As in other
areas where the interests of individuals
and our society must be balanced, the
answer is not to forgo the benefits of
employer and consumer arbitration
programs by prohibiting them per se
or unduly burdening the right to
impose a dispute resolution alternative
by contract before the dispute arises.
Neither an outright ban nor a
gone size fits all' straightjacket
solution is appropriate for the
problem of predispute arbitration
clauses in contracts of adhesion.
employees claim it is unfair to impose a
forfeiture of these important rights
unless their waivers are fully informed
and entirely voluntary, and the
arbitration process itself is
fundamentally fair - i.e., provides
adequate due process and remedies.
I am convinced that the core truths
of both propositions have merit.
Today, arbitration does have the
potential for more rapid, economical,
amicable dispute resolution as well as
overall satisfaction with the result -
and predispute arbitration agreements
should be enforced, but only if the
obligation and consequences of the
substitution of the required arbitration
process for a day in court is both clear
and fundamentally fair. After all, the
only real bargaining power available on
any aspect of these relationships is to
accept the terms offered or seek better
terms elsewhere. I favor enforcing the
obligation in predispute agreements to
Neither an outright ban nor a "one size
fits all" straightjacket solution is
appropriate.
Protocols provide guidance
The right answer is to provide
employers and product/service
providers the carrot-and-stick type of
guidance, like that found in the 1995
Employment Due Process Protocol and
the American Arbitration Association's
1998 Consumer Due Process Protocol,
enabling employers and providers to
develop arbitration programs and
contracting processes that are both
fundamentally fair and sufficiently
consensual. These protocols provide
guidelines rather than rules, and
encourage flexibility to ensure that
programs can be tailored to individual
employer and consumer environments.
As these protocols demonstrate,
the easiest hurdle is developing
arbitration programs that have
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